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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Defendant and Appellee Dr. Kevin Brown ("Brown" or "Defendant") 
disagrees with Plaintiff and Appellant Earl L. Cline IPs statement of jurisdiction. 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to U.C.A. § 
78A-4-103. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Did the trial court correctly grant Defendant's motion to dismiss Cline's 
42 U.S.C. §§1983, 1985, and 1986 claims against Brown? 
2. Did the trial court correctly conclude that Plaintiff failed to establish a 
claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Brown? 
3. Did the trial court correctly conclude that 42 U.S.C. § 1985 did not apply 
to Plaintiffs claims of gender discrimination against Brown? 
4. Did the trial court correctly conclude that Plaintiff failed to allege a 
common law conspiracy against Defendant Brown? 
STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
For all four issues the standard of appellate review is identical. Motions to 
Dismiss are appropriate for "failure of the pleading to state a claim upon which 
relief can be granted" and such motions "shall be treated as one for summary 
judgment and disposed of as provided in Rule 56." The standard for the appellate 
court's review of a trial court's legal conclusions and ultimate granting of a motion 
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to dismiss is set forth in Earl L. Cline, II vs. State of Utah, Division of Child and 
Family Services, 2005 UT App 498, 142 P. 3d 127, % 10. The trial court's granting 
of Defendant's motion to dismiss Plaintiffs claims pursuant to rule 12(b)(6) of the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure "presents questions of law that [the appellate court 
will] review for correctness, giving no deference to the decision of the [trial] 
court." Sullivan v. Sullivan, 2004 UT App 485, ^ 4, 105 P.3d 963 (quotations and 
citation omitted). Additionally, in reviewing the properness of the trial court's 
decision to grant a motion to dismiss, the appellate court will ".. .accept the factual 
allegations in the complaint as true and consider them, and all reasonable 
inferences to be drawn from them, in the light most favorable to the non[]moving 
party. We recite the facts accordingly." Wagner v. Clifton, 2002 UT 109, f 2, 62 
P.3d 440 (quotations and citation omitted). 
The trial court signed a final order dismissing all of Plaintiff s claims against 
Defendant Brown with prejudice and on the merits in accordance with rule 
12(b)(6) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. The District Court also certified the 
Order as a final order pursuant to rule 54(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
(R. 1006). This final order preserved the issues for appeal. 
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DETERMINATIVE RULES AND CODES 
There are two rules and three code sections whose interpretation is 
determinative of the appeal. The rules are Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) 
and 54(b). 
Utah R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) reads in its entirety: 
(b) How presented. Every defense, in law or fact, to claim for relief 
in any pleading, whether a claim, counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-
party claim, shall be asserted in the responsive pleading thereto if one 
is required, except that the following defenses may at the option of the 
pleader be made by motion: (1) lack of jurisdiction over the subject 
matter, (2) lack of jurisdiction over the person, (3) improper venue, 
(4) insufficiency of process, (5) insufficiency of service of process, (6) 
failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, (7) failure to 
join an indispensable party. A motion making any of these defenses 
shall be made before pleading if a further pleading is permitted. No 
defense or objection is waived by being joined with one or more other 
defenses or objections in a responsive pleading or motion or by 
further pleading after the denial of such motion or objection. If a 
pleading sets forth a claim for relief to which the adverse party is not 
required to serve a responsive pleading, the adverse party may assert 
at the trial any defense in law or fact to that claim for relief. If, on a 
motion asserting the defense numbered (6) to dismiss for failure of the 
pleading to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, matters 
outside the pleading are presented to and not excluded by the court, 
the motion shall be treated as one for summary judgment and disposed 
of as provided in Rule 56, and all parties shall be given reasonable 
opportunity to present all material made pertinent to such a motion by 
Rule 56. 
Utah R. Civ. P. 54(b) reads in its entirety: 
(b) Judgment upon multiple claims and/or involving multiple 
parties. When more than one claim for relief is presented in an action, 
whether as a claim, counterclaim, cross claim, or third party claim, 
and/or when multiple parties are involved, the court may direct the 
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entry of a final judgment as to one or more but fewer than all of the 
claims or parties only upon an express determination by the court that 
there is no just reason for delay and upon an express direction for the 
entry of judgment. In the absence of such determination and direction, 
any order or other form of decision, however designated, that 
adjudicates fewer than all the claims or the rights and liabilities of 
fewer than all the parties shall not terminate the action as to any of the 
claims or parties, and the order or other form of decision is subject to 
revision at any time before the entry of judgment adjudicating all the 
claims and the rights and liabilities of all the parties. 
The relevant codes are 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 1983, 1985, and 1986. 
42 U.S.C.A. § 1983 provides, in relevant part: 
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, 
custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of 
Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the 
United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the 
deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the 
Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action 
at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress 
42 U.S.C.A. § 1985(2) provides, in relevant part: 
Obstructing justice; intimidating party, witness, or juror. If two 
or more persons in any State or Territory conspire to deter, by force, 
intimidation, or threat, any party or witness in any court of the United 
States from attending such court, or from testifying to any matter 
pending therein, freely, fully, and truthfully, or to injure such party or 
witness in his person or property on account of his having so attended 
or testified, or to influence the verdict, presentment, or indictment of 
any grand or petit juror in any such court, or to injure such juror in his 
person or property on account of any verdict, presentment, or 
indictment lawfully assented to by him, or of his being or having been 
such juror; or if two or more persons conspire for the purpose of 
impeding, hindering, obstructing, or defeating, in any manner, the due 
course of justice in any State or Territory, with intent to deny to any 
citizen the equal protection of the laws, or to injure him or his 
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property for lawfully enforcing, or attempting to enforce, the right of 
any person, or class of persons, to the equal protection of the laws 
42 U.S,C.A. § 1986 provides, in relevant part: 
Action for neglect to prevent. Every person who, having knowledge 
that any of the wrongs conspired to be done, and mentioned in section 
1985 of this title, are about to be committed, and having power to 
prevent or aid in preventing the commission of the same, neglects or 
refuses so to do, if such wrongful act be committed, shall be liable to 
the party injured, or his legal representatives, for all damages caused 
by such wrongful act, which such person by reasonable diligence 
could have prevented; and such damages may be recovered in an 
action on the case; and any number of persons guilty of such wrongful 
neglect or refusal may be joined as defendants in the action; and if the 
death of any party be caused by any such wrongful act and neglect, 
the legal representatives of the deceased shall have such action 
therefor, and may recover not exceeding $5,000 damages therein, for 
the benefit of the widow of the deceased, if there be one, and if there 
be no widow, then for the benefit of the next of kin of the deceased. 
But no action under the provisions of this section shall be sustained 
which is not commenced within one year after the cause of action has 
accrued. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On or about March 3, 2005, Cline filed a complaint against numerous 
governmental and private defendants, including Defendant-Appellee Dr. Kevin 
Brown ("Brown" or "Defendant"), alleging misconduct related to a domestic 
relations action and child custody issues that resulted in violations of Cline5s civil 
rights. (R. 32). On or about May 4, 2005, Defendant-Appellee Brown filed a 
motion to dismiss all of Plaintiff-Appellant's claims against him. (R. 265). After 
briefing was completed and a hearing held, Brown's motion to dismiss without 
prejudice, along with that of other named parties, was granted on October 3, 2005. 
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(R. 651). The case proceeded forward with the remaining parties and claims. On 
or about October 27, 2005, Plaintiff-Appellant filed an amended civil rights 
complaint naming Brown as a party. (R. 704). On or about November 23, 2005, 
Defendant-Appellee Brown filed a second motion to dismiss all of Plaintiff-
Appellant's claims against it. (R. 765). On or about February 9, 2007, Defendant-
Appellee Brown filed a request to submit for decision his pending motion to 
dismiss. (R. 976). After briefing was completed and a hearing held, Brown's 
second motion to dismiss with prejudice and upon the merits was granted on May 
9, 2007. (R. 1006). The case proceeded forward with the remaining parties and 
claims. On June 6, 2007, Plaintiff-Appellant filed a Notice of Appeal, which 
included an appeal of the final order granting Brown's dismissal with prejudice 
and upon the merits. (R. 1014). 
Even though there was a final order as to Brown, on or about February 8, 
2008, Plaintiff-Appellant filed a second motion to amend his Complaint to add his 
previously adjudicated claims against Brown. Defendant-Appellee Brown filed a 
memorandum in opposition to Okie's Motion to Amend his claim on or about 
March 19,2008. 
STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS 
Brown, in his May 4, 2005 motion to dismiss and supporting memorandum, 
identified numerous failures of Plaintiff-Appellant's attempt to support Okie's 
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claims that 1) Brown owed a legal duty of care to Cline and 2) Brown breached a 
duty of care owed to Cline. (R. 265, ^  4-5). The set of circumstances giving rise to 
Plaintiff-Appellant's 2007 lawsuit are identical to those of his 2005 lawsuit. 
Prior to filing his 2005 lawsuit, Plaintiff-Appellant Cline was involved in 
both a domestic relations action and child custody issues with his former wife, 
Julie Cline. During Dr. Brown's employment with SLVMH, he provided 
testimony favorable to Ms. Cline, and in opposition to Plaintiff-Appellant, at a 
hearing regarding a protective order and child custody issues. Plaintiff-Appellant 
sued all involved parties for their alleged roles in his legal disputes with Ms. Cline. 
Plaintiff-Appellant failed to cite any factual evidence in his Complaint that 
supported his proffered theories that Brown owed Plaintiff-Appellant a duty of care 
and that Brown's testimony was a breach of that legal duty. With respect to 
Cline's claims that Brown was involved in a "conspiracy" with others, Cline did 
not state any facts upon which a court could find that 1) a conspiracy existed, and, 
2) if there was a conspiracy, that Brown participated. Finally, Cline fails to plead 
any specific facts that even suggest Brown is a state actor such that Brown could 
potentially violate Cline's civil rights under 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 1983, 1985 or 1986. 
Based on the utter lack of supporting facts for Plaintiff-Appellant's claims, 
the trial court appropriately granted Defendant's motion to dismiss Plaintiff-
Appellant's claims. (R. 1006). Plaintiff was unable to cure the defects in his 
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Complaint at a hearing before the Court on March 27, 2007. Lastly, in granting 
Defendant's motion to dismiss, the court did so as a Final Order with Prejudice and 
upon the merits. (R. 1006). 
In the 2007 Complaint and Amended Complaint, Plaintiff-Appellant claimed 
that Brown was involved in a "conspiracy" with others but did not lay any factual 
foundation upon which a court could find that 1) a conspiracy existed and, 2) if 
there was a conspiracy, that Brown participated. The only basis for Plaintiff-
Appellant's claim that Brown was a participant in a conspiracy was that Brown 
provided testimony that proved detrimental to Cline's position in his child custody 
dispute with his former wife. Nowhere in Plaintiffs Complaint does he cite 
specific facts to lay a foundation for any legal claims involving Brown. 
ARGUMENT SUMMARY 
The trial court correctly granted Brown's Motion for a Dismissal with 
Prejudice and Upon the Merits on Cline's civil rights and tort claims because Cline 
failed to state any facts upon which the court could find that 1) Brown owed a legal 
duty of care to Plaintiff-Appellant; 2) Brown breached a duty of care owed to 
Plaintiff-Appellant; and 3) Brown violated Plaintiffs civil rights claim granted 
under 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 1983, 1985 or 1986. The existence of a duty of care owed 
by Brown to Cline was never substantiated in any way by Plaintiff-Appellant. 
Absent any facts to imply that Dr. Brown, a health care provider employed by 
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SLVMH, had any legal duty to Cline, the court had no alternative but to find that a 
breach did not occur. The Utah State Supreme Court has clearly stated that u[i]t is 
axiomatic that one may not be liable to another in tort absent a duty." Loveland v. 
Qrem City Corp., 746 P.2d 763, 765 (Utah 1987). In this case, Dr. Brown did not 
owe any legal duty to Cline, thus there cannot be any breach such that damages or 
a cause of action could arise. 
Next, Plaintiffs claim that Dr. Brown was acting "under color of law" fails 
because Plaintiff did not provide any facts to the trial court to demonstrate that Salt 
Lake Valley Mental Health is either a governmental entity or agency or a part of 
the State of Utah. Because SLVMH is not a governmental entity or agency or part 
of the State of Utah, its employee, Dr. Kevin Brown is incapable of acting "under 
color of law." Since U.S.C.A. § 1983 applies only to persons acting "under color 
of law," the trial court properly dismissed Cline's § 1983 claim against Dr. Brown. 
Plaintiff-Appellant's conspiracy claims brought under U.S.C.A. § 1985 were 
also properly dismissed by the trial court because Plaintiff failed to provide any 
facts to support his conclusions that a conspiracy existed or that, if it did exist, that 
Dr. Brown participated. See Amended Complaint, % 69. Given the lack of any 
facts provided by Plaintiff to prove Dr. Brown's participation in an alleged 
conspiracy, Plaintiff also could not sustain and set forth no facts to support his 
claim that Dr. Brown had a legal duty to act under U.S.C.A. § 1985. Without any 
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facts provided by Plaintiff to support Dr. Brown's participation in a conspiracy, the 
trial court had no alternative but to dismiss Cline's §§ 1985 and 1986 claims as 
well. For these reasons, Plaintiff could not sustain any claims against Defendant 
premised on violations of Cline's civil rights under U.S.C.A. §§ 1983, 1985, and 
1986. The lack of facts to support Plaintiffs Pleadings affirm the correctness of the 
trial court's granting of Brown's Motion for a Dismissal with prejudice and upon 
the merits. 
ARGUMENT 
L The trial court correctly granted Brown's motion to dismiss with 
prejudice and upon the merits ail of Cline's claims. 
A party is entitled to a dismissal of claims made against it for the "failure of 
the pleading to state a claim upon which relief can be granted" and such motions 
"shall be treated as one for summary judgment and disposed of as provided in Rule 
56." Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). "A motion to dismiss is appropriate 
only where it clearly appears that the plaintiffs would not be entitled to relief under 
the facts alleged or under any set of facts they could prove to support their claim." 
Baker v. Angus, 910 P.2d 427, Utah 1996, citing Coleman v. Utah State Land Bd., 
795 P.2d 622, 624, Utah 1990. 
The general standard for reviewing a trial court's granting of a motion to 
dismiss is set forth in Earl L. Cline, II vs. State of Utah, Division of Child and 
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Family Services. 2005 UT App 498, Filed November 17, 2005, Writ of certiorari 
denied Cline v. State, 2006 Utah LEXIS 82 (Utah, Apr. 20, 2006). 
"In determining whether the trial court properly granted a motion to 
dismiss, we accept the factual allegations in the complaint as true and 
consider them, and all reasonable inferences to be drawn from them, 
in the light most favorable to the non[] moving party. We recite the 
facts accordingly." Wagner v. Clifton. 2002 UT 109, P2, 62 P.3d 440 
(quotations and citation omitted)." 
Lastly, when presented with a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, "courts can and 
should reject 'legal conclusions,' 'unsupported conclusions,' 'unwarranted 
references,' 'unwarranted deductions,' 'footless conclusions of law,' and 
'sweeping legal conclusions in the form of actual allegations.' Morse v. Lower 
Merion School Dist. 132 F.3d 902, 907, n. 8 (3d Cir. 1997). 
To successfully state a cause of action brought under 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983, a 
Plaintiff must first "allege that some person has deprived him of a federal right. 
Second, he must allege that the person who has deprived him of that right acted 
under color of state or territorial law." Gomez v. Toledo, 446 U.S. 635, 640, 100 
S.Ct. 1920, 1923, 64 L.Ed.2d 572 (1980). 
In asserting a civil rights claim brought under 42 U.S.C. A. § 1985, Plaintiff-
Appellant "... must plead facts with specificity [footnote omitted]. A complaint 
which contains only broad and conclusory statements, unsupported by factual 
allegations, is not sufficient to support a cause of action under 42 U.S.C.A. § 1985, 
[footnote omitted], nor is a complaint which merely restates the statutory language 
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of 42 U.S.C.A. § 1985 [footnote omitted]...." 15 Am. Jur. 2d Civil Rights $$ 180. 
Civil rights claims of conspiracy that are vague and provide no basis in fact must 
be dismissed. Conway v. Garvey, 2003 WL 22510384 (S.D. N.Y. 2003). 
Cline was required to set forth specific material facts in his pleading such 
that an opposing party would have notice of the claims against him. Plaintiffs 
complaints only contained mere allegations that do not provide any factual support 
of his claims involving civil rights violations. Therefore, the trial court correctly 
found that, because Plaintiff failed to plead any facts with specificity that could 
sustain a cause of action under 42 U.S.C.A. § 1985, Plaintiff could not demonstrate 
his civil rights were violated. Furthermore, a violation of 42 U.S.C.A. § 1985 is a 
prerequisite to a finding that a person's civil rights were violated under 42 
U.S.C.A. § 1986. Consequently, Plaintiffs failure to state a cause of action for 
civil rights violation under 42 U.S.C.A. § 1985 means that Plaintiff also failed to 
plead a cause of action under 42 U.S.C.A. § 1986. 
In tandem, the trial court was correct in determining that Plaintiff failed to 
satisfy the requirements of Rule 12(b)(6) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure in 
that he did not state a cause of action upon which relief could be granted, 
Defendant was entitled to a dismissal of claims, with prejudice and upon the 
merits. 
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A, The Trial Court correctly granted a dismissal of Cline's 42 
U.S.C.A. § 1983 civil rights claims against Brown. 
A pre-requisite to finding a violation of 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983 is that a person 
was acting under color of state or territorial law. In this instant case, in order to 
establish that Dr. Brown was acting under "color of law", Plaintiff was required to 
demonstrate that Salt Lake Valley Mental Health, Brown's employer is either a 
governmental entity or agency or a part of the State of Utah. Cline's 42 U.S.C.A. § 
1983 civil rights claims against Brown failed because Cline did not provide any 
facts that would establish that SLVMH is a state actor. Because SLVMH is not a 
state actor, its employee, Dr. Kevin Brown is incapable of acting "under color of 
law." Given that Dr. Brown cannot act "under color of law" he is therefore, not 
"liable to the party injured." As U.S.C.A. § 1983 applies only to persons acting 
"under color of law," the trial court properly dismissed Cline's § 1983 claim 
against Dr. Brown. 
B. The Trial Court correctly granted a dismissal of Cline's 42 
U.S.C.A. § 1985 civil rights claims against Brown. 
Plaintiff-Appellant's conspiracy claims brought under U.S.C.A. § 1985 were 
also properly dismissed by the trial court because Plaintiff failed to provide any 
facts to support his conclusions that a conspiracy existed or that, if it did exist, that 
Dr. Brown participated. See Amended Complaint, % 69. Given the lack of any 
facts provided by Plaintiff to prove Dr. Brown's participation in an alleged 
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conspiracy, Plaintiff also could not sustain his claim that Dr. Brown had a legal 
duty to act under 42 U.S.CA. § 1985. 
C. The Trial Court correctly granted a dismissal of Cline's 42 
ILS.C-A. § 1986 civil rights claims against Brown, 
Without any facts provided by Plaintiff to support Dr. Brown's participation 
in a conspiracy, the trial court had no alternative but to dismiss Cline's § 1986 
claim as well. For these reasons, Plaintiff could not sustain any claims against 
Defendant premised on violations of Cline's civil rights under U.S.CA. §§ 1983, 
1985, and 1986. The lack of facts to support Plaintiffs Pleadings affirm the 
correctness of the trial court's granting of Brown's Motion for a Dismissal with 
prejudice and upon the merits. In the instant case there was no evidence that Dr. 
Brown conspired with others and against Cline to deprive Cline of any legal rights 
he may have with respect to custody of the minor child he shared with Ms. Cline. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, Defendant and Appellee Brown respectfully 
requests this court to affirm the trial court's decision granting Brown's motion to 
dismiss with prejudice and upon the merits all claims alleged against it by Plaintiff 
and Appellant Cline. 
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DATED this It, day of May 2008. 
DUNN & DUNN 
z 
iVIND. SWENSON 
Attorneys for Defendant Dr. Kevin Brown 
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Pursuant to UTAH R. APP. 21(b), the undersigned hereby certifies that on the 
date indicated below I caused to be served a true copy of the foregoing BRIEF OF 
DEFENDANT AND APPELLEE DR. KEVIN BROWN, by the method 
indicated below, to the following: 
Earl Cline, Pro Se Appellant 
6315 Fairwind Drive 
West Jordan, Utah 84084 
( X) U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
( ) Hand Delivered 
( ) Overnight Mail 
DATED this _$_ day of May 2008. 
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CLIFFORD C. ROSS, #2802 
DUNN & DUNN, P.C. 
505 East 200 South, 2nd Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
Telephone: (801) 521-6666 
Facsimile: (801)521-9998 
Attorneys for Defendant Kevin Brown 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, 
UTAH COUNTY, PROVO DEPARTMENT, STATE OF UTAH 
EARL L. CLINE II, 
Plaintiff pro se 
vs. 
STATE OF UTAH, EDSON F. PACKER and 
SHARON B. PACKER, ET ALS. , 
INCLUDING DEFENDANT DR. KEVIN 
BROWN 
Defendants. 
FINAL ORDER AND JUDGMENT OF 
DISMISSAL WITH PREJUDICE AND 
UPON THE MERITS OF ALL 
PLAINTIFFS' CLAIMS AGAINST DR. 
KEVIN BROWN 
Civil No. 050401710 CR 
Honorable Fred D. Howard 
This matter came before the Court for hearing on March 29, 2007 at 9:00 a.m. Clifford C 
Ross of Dunn & Dunn, P.C, appeared for Dr. Kevin Brown. Earl L. Cline II, Plaintiff pro se, 
appeared on his own behalf. Before the Court was the written Motion of Defendant Dr. Kevin 
Brown to Dismiss the First Amended Complaint of Plaintiff Earl L. Cline II with prejudice and 
upon the merits. Also before the Court was the verbal motion made by counsel for Defendant 
Dr. Kevin Brown in open court and during the hearing that the Court expressly determine that 
1 
Fourth Judicial District Court 
of Utah County, State ef Utah 
there is no just reason for delay direct and expressly direct that final judgment enter on all 
claims of Dr. Kevin Brown and Plaintiff in accordance with U.R.Cv.P. 54(b). The Court 
made its written ruling filed April 10, 2007 after having carefully considered the oral 
argument by the parties and all pertinent memoranda and other papers on file. Being fully 
informed, the Court now ORDERS and ADJUDGES as follows: 
L The motion of Dr. Kevin Brown is well taken and is granted. 
2, Plaintiffs complaint, all amendments thereof, and all other claims of Plaintiff 
against Dr. Kevin Brown are dismissed with prejudice and upon the merits. 
3. The Court in accordance with U.R.Cv.P. 54(b) expressly determines that there 
is no just reason for delay and expressly directs that this be entered as the final order and 
judgment disposing of all claims of Plaintiff Earl S. Cline II against Defendant Dr, Kevin 
Brown. 
SO ORDERED and ADJUDGED. 
Dated this Y? day of 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this /<* day of April, 2007 I caused true and correct copies of the 
foregoing to be served by first class, postage prepaid, upon: 
Earl L. Cline II 
Plaintiff pro se 
5128 West 12600 South 
Salt Lake City, UT 84065 
Earl L. Cline II 
Plaintiff pro se 
2225 East 4800 South #225 
Holliday,UT 84117 
Peggy E. Stone 
Steve A. Combe 
Utah Attorney General's Office 
160 East 300 South, 6th Floor 
Salt Lake City, UT 84114-0856 
Shawn D. Turner 
Larson & Turner 
1218 West South Jordan Parkway, Unit B 
South Jordan, UT 84095 
Gregory B. Wall 
Cory Wall 
Wall & Wall 
4460 South Highland Drive, #200 
Salt Lake City, UT 84124 
Stephen W. Owens 
Epperson & Rencher, P.C. 
Crandall Bldg., Suite 500 
lOWest 100 South 
Salt Lake City, UT 84101 
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